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Arguments for the Existence of God: The Rational Arguments (07)
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Paul Jang
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2008-03-04 21:35:43, hit : 4,542 |
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Nevertheless, Kant regards this argument as the best of the three which were named, ontological, cosmological, and teleological, but claims that it does not prove the existence of God, nor of a Creator, but only of a great architect who fashioned the world (Berkhof, 1971, 26).
He said , teleological argument "can at most demonstrate the existence of an architect of the world, not of a creator of the world, to whom all things are subject" (Kant, 1887, 385).
He insisted that the teleological argument can be concluded as this: This argument is based on experience of design and order in the world. But experience never provides us with the idea of an absolutely perfect and necessary Being. Hence a necessary Being cannot be provided from the design in the world (Gleisler and Corduan, 1988, 106). In conclusion, Kant assumed a dubious attitude to the teleological argument for the existence of God.
David Hume also assumed a skeptical attitude to the teleological argument. His skeptical alternatives to the teleological argument was based on the two responses to the teleological argument of a skeptic, Philo. The first argument of Philo is as follows:
Different from human intelligence, since human inventions differ from those of nature. Finite, since the effect is finite. Imperfect, for there are imperfections in nature. Multiple, for the creation of the world is more like the cooperative building of a ship. Male and female, for this is the way humans generate. Anthropomorphic, for his creature has eyes, ears, noses, and other physical traits. (Burrill, 1967, 184-191)
The second argument of Philo insists that it is possible that the world arose by chance, therefore this argument does not recognize that there is design in the world. This argument may be stated as this: The apparent order in the world resulted from either design or from chance. It is entirely plausible that the world resulted from chance (Buriill, 1967, 191-198).
Alvin Plantinga also agrees with such critiques from David Hume (Plantinga, 1967, 107-111). He allows that there might be a smidgen evidence for design in the universe, but then argues that it is virtually impossible to go on and draw inferences from that bit of insight to the existence or nature of God as designer (Plantinga, 1974, 84).
F.R. Tennant evaluates the alternative to the teleological argument to be conceivable but highly improbable (Hick, ed. 1964, 120-136).
Julian Huxley, as an archdefender of evolution, estimated that at the known rate of helpful mutations over the known time scale the odds against evolution happening by pure chance alone were three million zero to one (Huxley, 1953, 46).
Bertrand Russell also suggested the teleological argument in the standpoint of evolution as this: (1) the adaptation of means to end in the world is either the result of evolution or else the result of design. (2) This adaptation is the result of evolution. (3) Therefore, this adaptation is not the result of design (Russell, 1957, 589).
But Taylor tried to accomplish with his argument of the existence of God based on the apparent advanced planning within nature. He made an effort to handle both the evolutionary and chance alternatives in order to set up his theory of the argument of existence of God.
Besides, R.E.D. Clark tried to argue the existence of God in the view of possibility that the apparent order is only a happy accident (Clark, 1922, 49).
John Stuart Mill objected to Paley's argument of the teleological argument from analogy. Of course his objection is not whole negation of but a weakening of the teleological argument (Burrill, 1967, 177-184).
Stuart C. Hackett agrees with Mill on the question of whether the method of analogy weakens the teleological argument (Harkett, 1984, 106).
He states his argument with three premises as follows: (1) All composites that involve the relation of complex means so as to produce a significant result are composites of whose cause purposive intelligence is an indispensable aspect. (2) The space-time universe is a composite in which complex means are so related as to produce significant results. (3) therefore, the space-time universe is a composite of whose cause purposive intelligence is an indispensable aspect (Hackett, 1984, 106).
Augustus Hopkins Strong points out the defects of the teleological argument for the existence of God as follows:
(1) The argument cannot prove a personal God....(2) Even if this argument could prove personality in the intelligence and will that originated the order of the universe, it could not prove either the unity, the eternity, of the infinity of God; not the unity--for the useful collocations of the universe might be the result of oneness of counsel, instead of oneness of essence in the contriving intelligence; not the eternity--since all marks of order and collocation within our observation ate simply finite. (Strong, 1985, 78-79)
Strong also says not properly an argument from design to a designer; for that design implies a designer is simply an identical proposition (Strong, 1985, 75). He continues to explain this:
It may be more correctly stated as follow: Order and useful collocation pervading a system respectively imply intelligence and purpose as the cause of that order and collocation. Since order and useful collocation pervade the universe, there must exist an intelligence adequate to the production of this order, and a will adequate to direct this collocation to useful ends. (Strong, 1985, 75)
Nevertheless, he, in spite of this defects, recognized the value of the teleological argument for the existence of God. He states this value of the argument as follows:
It proves from certain useful collocations and instanced of order which have clearly had a beginning, or in other word, from the present harmony of the universe, that there exists an intelligence and will adequate to its contrivance. But whether this intelligence and will is personal or impersonal, creator or only fashioner, one or many, finite or infinite, eternal of owing its being to another, necessary or free, this argument cannot assure us. (Strong, 1985, 80)
This argument was proposed by Socrates, and then has been advocated the most popular and important argument by Augustine, Cicero, Kant, and Strong.
Rev. H. Hoeksema commends this teleological argument that it is the most abundant and finest argument, and adds that it leads to not only super-power and the last cause but to the One who is the personal Designer of all things and the owner of intelligence, volition, and wisdom (Hoeksema, 166, 45).
He also defines the Designer as "God" and he likes this teleological argument; "O Lord, How many are Thy works! In wisdom, Thou hast made them all; The earth is full of Thy possessions" (Ps. 104:24; Hoeksema, 1966, 46).
A.S. Edington pointed that it is totally different between the mathematical and mechanical possibility of science, and the theological and universal possibility of theology. James. O. Buswell insisted that the theistic argument from teleology is not in the slightest degree inconsistent with recognition of what we call mathematical, or mechanical chance (Buswell, vol. I, 1962, 88).
And he said that if this argument is unsound, then the words of Scriptures (Ps. 94:9 and Rom. 1:18-22) are false. And also, if this argument is sound then the created universe is sufficient evidence, and unbelievers who possess the evidence is inexcusable (Buswell, 1962, 86).
But this teleological argument, which belongs to the general revelation, is valuable only when it must be supported by the special revelation, because this argument also assumes the Designer outside the universe, who may become an infinite Being.
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Introduction
Theology 