|
|
|
|
|
Arguments for the Existence of God: The Rational Arguments (05)
|
|
|
Paul Jang
|
2008-03-04 21:32:07, hit : 3,780 |
|
|
Other Objections to the Ontological Argument
Coleridge claimed that it is absurd that there were the ideas of accordance between a subjective idea of the existence of God and real Being. We have an idea of an existence, but yet its accordance with a real Being must be proved (Shedd, 1889, p.333). Therefore Coleridge insisted that it is impossible to practically prove the existence of God by the ontological argument.
Leibnitz consented that the basic ontological argument was valid that it was necessary to demonstrate that the concept of God was not contradictory. Leibnitz, as a middle-of-the-roader, insisted that the ontological proofs must be modified into a perfect argument in spite of sensing that the ontological argument was of use to prove the existence of God.
He gave the argument in support of the crucial minor premise: a perfection is a simple and irreducible quality without any essential limits. And whatever is simple cannot conflict with other irresolvably simple qualities. And also, whatever differs in kind with another cannot conflict with it. Therefore, it is possible for one Being (God) to possess all possible perfections (Geisler and Corduan, 1988, 132).
Leibnitz's argument depends on the validity of the principle of the actual identity of what is conceptually indiscernible. There is a move from the conceptual to the actual that is open to challenge. In fact, he objected the ontological argument by Leibnitz in the standpoint of the middle-of-the-road.
Saying in other words, he was in the ambiguous standpoint that all beings would be regarded as the possibilities until their impossibilities were proved. He said that Anselm's argument would be regarded as geometrically a priori if the possibility of the absolutely perfect Being could be explained (Shedd, 1889, p.234).
To this, Clarck said that what something existed was clear, and it must be recognized by even atheists as well as theists. It is introductory to the principle of existence whenever there has been nothing to exist.
In other words, an existence would be the attribute of Being if one thing was Being itself. But Shedd said this assertion is no more his own statement (Shedd, 1889, p.235).
This ontological argument proved by Anselm had been objected by even Aquinas, nevertheless, its advocators proved their opinion to be correct, to their opponents, that the idea of the absolutely perfect One (God), which is totally different from that of casual existence, has the trait of necessary Being (dogma).
Clark's Proof of the Ontological Argument
Samuel Clark (1675-1729) had tried to deductively come to the conclusion of the proof for the existence of God, starting from the proposition, i.e., "something exists." His argument also is a priori. He says:
Nothing is necessary existence, the non-existence of which is conceivable. We can conceive of the non-existence of the world; therefore the world is not necessarily existing and eternal. We cannot, however, conceive of the non-existence of space and duration; therefore space and duration are necessary and infinite. Space and duration, however are not substances (i.e., God), of which they are the accidents. (Hodge, 1973, 206)
But this theory is absurd for the reason why it has become, in fact, no more than a posteriori argument that it inferred from the existence of time and space the existence of a substantial Being.
In a different expression, it can be said as this: space and time are attributes of substance or being (for the modes of existence). But space and time are respectively infinite and eternal. Therefore there must be an infinite and eternal substance or Being to whom these attributes belong.
But space and time are neither attributes of substance or being, nor modes of existence. And also, space and time are neither infinite and eternal substance or Being because there is no eternal One except for God, the Creator. Space and time are nothing more than the creatures of God, the Creator.
Cousin's Proof for the Ontological Argument
Victor Cousin (1792-1867) tried to arrive from the idea of the finite to the infinite based on the psychological principle. In fact, he approached the existence of God with these two ideas: finite and infinite in his "Elements of Psychology".
He says that these two ideas are logical correlatives; and in the order of their acquisition, that of the finite and imperfect precedes the order; but it scarcely precedes it. It is not possible for the reason, as soon as consciousness furnishes the mind with the idea of the infinite and imperfect, not to conceive the idea of the infinite and imperfect. Now, the infinite and perfect is God." (Cousin, Elements of Psychology, Trans. Prof. Henry, New York, 1856, p.375)
He also states the subject of the correlative idea of the two as the following:
that, as the mind in perception takes cognizance of the object as a real existence, distinct from itself, so the reason has an apprehension, or immediate cognition of the Infinite, with a necessary conviction of its reality as distinguished (in one sense) from itself. Self nature, and God are alike and equally involved in the intuitive apprehension of the mind; and they are inseparable. (Hodge, 1973, 207)
But, according to the theory of relativity, we cannot take the one without the other. As much as this theory is alike, if we take a finite, we must be an infinite; and so there is a big problem: the question, "What is that Infinite?" For Cousin, the Infinite is the All. Therefore, God is the All, and the All is God. This is nothing more than a pantheism from the metaphysical argument.
In conclusion, in spite of some objections to the ontological argument, some have advocated this proof. But of these, Spinoza concluded to be the argument for a pantheistic God. Hartshorne also ended with a pantheistic God though Descartes and Leibnitz concluded a theistic God. Therefore, Henle insisted that at best, apart from importing some kind of Platonic premise, the ontological argument yields polytheistic gods (Henle, 1965, 178).
In the ontological argument, the idea of "to be" resembles the idea of "to be" (I AM THAT I AM) in the Scripture (Ex. 3:14). But there is a fundamental difference between the two ideas. The idea of the ontological idea, "to be" which is the name of the pagan religious philosophy, means his attribute but not his essence, not being accordance with the idea "to be" of the Bible which is a special revelation.
Even though we presuppose the existence as the idea of God, the idea itself cannot be God. Buswell takes the ground of Being as God to be by himself which is the concept of God of the Bible (He who is, is a datum). He said that it is worthy for the ontological argument only when it presupposes the God as the Spirit (Buswell, 1963, 98; 22, 283).
Cornelius Van Till did not believe in the idea of common ground of Buswell (Van Til, 1969, 288; 1955, 253-256). He insisted that Buswell modified Thomism, therefore, he agreed with the Thomism in rejecting Anselm's form of the ontological argument for the existence of God (Van Til, 1969, 284). Van Til did completely disregard the reason of man, in relation to prove the existence of God.
But Dr. James Orr recognized the value of this ontological argument of the existence of God, and also he had highly evaluated the value of the reason of man (Orr, 1948, pp. 104-106).
But Keith E. Yandell said, "Unless some variety of the ontological argument succeeds, God does not exist is not a contradiction. Both, there is no numinous being and there are no physical objects are logically consistent (Yandell, 1984, 19).
Geisler and Corduan conclude that the ontological argument as such is invalid, while some have suggested that their conclusion is invalid because the very concept of "nothing" is negative, and thus presupposes that something exists (Geisler and Corduan, 1988, 148).
The writer believes that the ontological argument cannot be accepted as a perfect proof for the existence of God even though it helps us a little bit to understand the existence of God. In other words, the argument may help us to understand the existence of God under the general revelation, but cannot help us to receive the salvation of God through the special revelation (the Bible).
.. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Introduction
Theology 